Critical Review

Professionalism & the New York City Teacher Role: A View through the Lens of Organisational Structure

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Contextualization

Notions of teacher professionalism have been studied and discussed widely among education scholars, with many of these notions changing across time and place. In contrast, the role of organisational models in education has been a less studied area, with the majority of research existing in business and management oriented fields. Using the urban context of New York City as a platform for exploration, this paper looks to merge these two fields of study and answer the following questions: How do current organisational models contribute to the development of various forms of teacher professionalism? How might alternative organisational models contribute differently to professionalism? In exploring these questions, teacher professionalism is treated as a symptomatic organisational behaviour operating within a prescribed system. Accountability, as a central component of New York City's form of managerial professionalism, is also explored as it relates to both the teacher role and other related organisational roles.

Abstract: This article is rooted in the belief that our effectiveness in any role is dependent, to some degree, on the contribution and support of others. Using a New York City context, the teacher role is examined in relation to other, within-system roles. These roles (superintendents, principals, policy-makers etc.) often function within formalized systems which can be seen as promoting or blocking different types of teacher professionalism. Here the lens of organisational structure is used to move away from the 'microscopic' view of the teacher (e.g. teacher role in isolation) and provide a more holistic view of the teacher within the context of a comprehensive system. It provides an aerial view of the teacher and examines how his/her effectiveness might be influenced by other roles existing within the formal system. The juxtaposition of professionalism and organisational structure attempts to connect new threads of information in human behaviour among the multiple layers and roles which operate within the New York City education system. In this way, professionalism models are treated as by-products of the organisational structures which support them. Current and alternative organisational structures are compared, with a special focus on structural designs which offer increased reciprocity and a more equitable distribution of accountability.

Geographic Background

The United States of America

I begin with an overview of the U.S education system and move on to the New York City school system. Education, at all levels, in the United States is composed of a highly decentralized system with each of the fifty states having complete autonomy over how each administers and manages their respective education system (U.S Department of Education, 2010a). This autonomy is all-encompassing and it includes teacher-training programmes,

teacher certification, establishment of learning standards, as well as the administration of state testing to monitor student progress (Jennings, 2011).

To decentralize even further, states often pass on a significant amount of autonomy to smaller sub-regions (districts), allowing them to further differentiate the delivery of curriculum (U.S Department of Education, 2010a). Quite often, even within a given sub-region, individual schools may choose to use different textbooks based on teacher/administrator preferences (U.S Department of Education, 2010a)**.** According to Hannaway, Murphy & Reed (2004) the ability of individual states, districts, or even schools to serve as 'incubators' for educational innovations is perceived as an advantage by some educators. In contrast, they also point out the widely perceived disadvantage of decentralisation, which includes the lack of a systematic approach to student learning and policy development. This key weakness has resulted in a recent national movement for states to adopt Common Core Standards. The movement has resulted in 47 out of 50 states choosing to participate in a more unified set of learning standards (Common Core Standards Initiative, 2011).

The federal government's role in U.S. education has been historically limited (U.S Department of Education, 2010a). The federal government does, however, exert some passive control through funding opportunities it provides to states willing to administer its federal programmes. One of the most well-known programmes is the "No Child Left Behind Act', a federal programme specifically designed to support minority and disadvantaged students (No Child Left Behind Act, 2001). While participation remains optional, most states are quite willing to tap into these additional funds. In 2010, 5 billion U.S dollars were distributed to states across the nation to implement the programme (U.S Department of Education, 2010b).

New York City

New York City schools currently have 1.1 million students representing over 171 languages, with most of these students coming from lower income households (NYC Independent Budget Office, 2011). In comparison to the rest of the state, New York City faces additional challenges in educating its student population. Demographic factors such as poverty, high crime neighbourhoods, single parent or dysfunctional homes, homes where English is not spoken and the inability of some parents to help their children with homework are all contributing factors to New York City's comparatively poor achievement results (Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., et al., v. the State of New York, et al 2002, p.29).

Like other cities across the United States, school funding in New York City is drawn largely from state budgets, some federal programmes and private sources, as well as a substantial amount (approximately 41%) from neighbourhood property taxes. This heavy reliance on property taxes has resulted in a rather uneven distribution of resources, with wealthier communities having a much richer resource base to draw on. In contrast, schools in poorer neighbourhoods are left with a significantly smaller distribution of wealth. In an attempt to address this gap in resources, poorer districts have the option of using supplemental funding provided through federal government compensatory education programmes (U.S. Department of Education, 2010a).

In 2001 Michael Bloomberg was elected mayor of New York City. Unlike his predecessors, Bloomberg announced publicly that he would hold himself personally accountable for the success or failure of the city's education system. After granting sizable pay increases to school teachers, Bloomberg negotiated taking control of the city's schools and abolished the long-standing NYC Board of Education (Meyer, 2008). This move was followed by the hiring of a non-educator, anti-trust lawyer to manage the restructuring and fixing of accountability. The term 'accountability' refers here to holding educators directly responsible for student

learning. Shortly after the new appointment, building principals were given complete autonomy for budgetary and financial matters in their respective school buildings (Shulman, Sullivan & Glanz, 2008). The restructuring of NYC education also included a push for more charter schools - privately run, but publicly financed schools which are run by parents, educators and/or companies - as well as an increase in the number of smaller secondary schools (Meyer, 2008).

Since Bloomberg's re-election in 2005, and then again in 2009, additional reorganisation measures have been implemented. Some of these measures include a new rating system for schools, a new financing scheme as well as a rigorous review of teachers before granting tenure (Meyer, 2008), with tenure ensuring a fairly permanent job for those who acquire it. Teacher evaluation procedures, in particular, have been subject to change. In 2010 a pilot group of 33 of the state's persistently lowest achieving schools have been required to implement a new 100-point scale teacher evaluation (UFT, 2010b).

The New York City Teacher

Professionalism

Professionalism is often described within the context of particular behaviours. This review looks to connect these behaviours to the organisational structures which they operate out of. Before weaving in the role of organisational structures, this section aims to (1) briefly identify selected theoretical models of professionalism, as they relate to teachers, in general and (2) provide a window into the climate and conditions in which New York City teachers, in particular, function. Before describing the current model of professionalism used in New York City, it is important to understand the historical perspective from which it emerged. As such, I begin with a description of the theoretical model of *traditional professionalism*. Traditional professionalism was strongest from 1950 to 1970 (Whitty, 2008). Although referring to teacher professionalism in England, Whitty (2008) points out that education reforms in England were influential in other parts of the world as well. He describes traditional professionalism as a time when:

> Parents were expected to trust teachers to know what was best for their children. . . the teacher's role included the freedom to decide not only how to teach but also what to teach. (Whitty, 2008, p.33)

Traditional professionalism is often referred to as the 'Golden Age' of teaching (Legrande, 1997). During this time, teacher authority was rarely questioned and teachers enjoyed substantial control over their work (Whitty, 2008). While this form of professionalism provided substantial teacher control, it failed to provide adequate accountability measures. Whitty (2008) writes that beginning in the mid-70's, calls began for all public sector providers to be subjected to increased accountability measures. This took the form of market-based competition and increased surveillance by the state (Whitty, 2008). The recent restructuring of New York City education can be seen as a similar response. In New York City, poor student performance on standardized tests in reading and mathematics has given birth to a new reform movement, which contrasts sharply with the traditional approach (Shulman, Sullivan & Glanz, 2008).

Managerial professionalism began, and remains, firmly embedded in the belief that decisions about what to teach, how to teach and how to assess students should be made at school and national levels rather than by individual teachers (Furlong, 2005 cited in Whitty, 2008 p. 38). In some ways, managerial professionalism can be viewed as the inverse of traditional professionalism: here we see substantial teacher accountability measures, but very limited control. A teacher working in a persistently low-achieving school in New York City, for

example, is currently required to teach the curriculum from a prescribed programme provided by city central authorities (Schulman, Sullivan & Glanz, 2008)**.** A 'value added formula' is then used to hold the teacher accountable for student growth each year (UFT, 2010). The 'value added formula' is intended to level the playing field for teachers of higher-needs and lower-needs students when it comes to standardized test scores. It assesses progress, rather than absolute proficiency levels (UFT, 2010). Although such a teacher is given little autonomy in how s/he teaches, the teacher continues to be held directly accountable for student progress.

One of the central features of managerial professionalism is its focus on accountability. In New York City, this accountability has been unevenly distributed with the heaviest burden falling on teachers. Indeed, a recent study revealed that 74% of the city's high school graduates who enrolled in the city's six community colleges failed at least one placement test (reading, writing, mathematics) and needed to take remediation classes in order to participate in the college programme (Winerip, 2011). Criticism highlighting the lack of teacher accountability has been particularly noticeable among city officials. One example includes an attempt by the New York City Department of Education to hand over to the media the names of English language arts and maths teachers (4th through 8th grade), based on their students' standardized test scores (UFT, 2010a). The Foundation for Education Reform and Accountability has also published several reports questioning the competency and trustworthiness of New York City teachers. One such report, proposes a four-step process to curbing cheating by teachers on tests. Some of the report recommendations include prohibiting teachers from scoring their own students' exams as well as prohibiting teachers from administering exams (Backstrom, 2011).

Yet managerial professionalism has not been without its own criticism. In New York City, managerial professionalism has taken on the form of a largely test score driven approach, as opposed to an instructional quality approach (Shulman, Sullivan & Glanz, 2008). This test score driven approach has translated into the intensive and stifling micro-management of teachers, as well as the narrowing of the curriculum (Connell, 2009). Sachs (2001) writes about an alternative form of professionalism: *democratic professionalism.* Democratic professionalism emphasizes collaborative and cooperative action between teachers and the community members it serves (Sachs, 2001).This membership extends to students, parents and agencies outside the traditional educational realm. An especially ambitious form of professionalism, democratic professionalism also calls for the close collaboration of practising teachers and academics in mutually identified projects (Sachs, 2001). Interestingly, Menter et al (1997 cited in Quicke, 2000, p. 305) cautions that attempts to weave into the rhetoric the language of collaboration and democracy have been made, while continuing to operate under a managerial methodology.

Climate and Conditions

In England, Menter et al (1997 cited in Quicke, 2000, p.305) conducted case studies in primary schools, which revealed a consistent disparity in the use of democratic professional rhetoric operating in managerial professionalism contexts. Despite the heavy use of democratic terms, the case studies revealed a consistent reduction in teacher autonomy coupled with an increase in work load. In these studies 'collaboration' often took the form of a large number of weekly meetings which tended to be about implementing decisions which had already been made elsewhere - rather than being products of genuine collaboration. Quicke describes this phenomenon as "... a language of oppression, one that is heavily disguised in the vocabulary of legitimate community and democratic practice." (Quicke, 2000, p.301). This practice can also be found within the New York City education model. The confidential communication below is from a grade 5 teacher with 27 students in her classroom. Out of these students, 26 are ESL students (English as a Second Language):

Spanish (15), Mandarin (2), Arabic (2), Bengali (4), Vietnamese (1), Portuguese (2). Eight of those 27 are also classified as special education students. When asked to discuss her teacher requirements she writes the following:

> Supervisors do informal observations, 4 formal evaluations and 6 mini observations per year. We were given a rubric on what they will score us on. They make it seem as if we are scoring ourselves, but really it feels like they just want to catch us doing something wrong. I had one of those visits already, the supervisor was supposed to give me a heads-up, but she didn't, she just walked in and started taking notes, then I met with her the following period, she made me look at a rubric and score myself.... then a few days later she gave me a letter about the observation and meeting... and what my next steps should be.

> We are told that we need to keep documentation of our students' progress. Data, data, data on everything and we need to have proof. I don't have enough textbooks (social studies) in my room, the math lessons in the books are not aligned with the teacher's edition or the re-teach book. The enrich book is all out of order or missing lessons. Students must be grouped for the most part of the day, there needs to be on-going differentiated instruction and groups need to be posted. Data on each student needs to be available for review at all times.

> I am also responsible for keeping a running record of my interaction with the parents and a running record of their reading level. I have to keep notes on all conferencing I do with each child at least twice a week in the following subjects: reading, listening, speaking, math, science, social studies, grammar and writing. I also teach them gym because there aren't enough gym teachers and I also teach them music. There are a total of 17 writing pieces that need to be handed in to our supervisors on the 4 major subjects… rough draft and final draft including a rubric for each one. Comments need to be made on student work in all subject areas. There are a total of 9 project/activities that are due this year in addition to the writing pieces, conferencing, running records, etc.

Using questionnaire responses from 92 NYC public school teachers, coaches (experienced teachers responsible for supporting teachers with implementing the newest reforms) and administrators, along with 41 representative interviews from the same group, Shulman, Sullivan & Ganz (2008) validate similar supervisory pressures on a larger scale. Their study finds limited administrative instructional supervision within the New York City reform context, with many administrators being overwhelmingly perceived by teachers as a type of inspector or 'snoopervisor'. Shulman, Sullivan & Ganz (2008) note that many supervisors have taken a potentially collaborative and reflective approach, like the classroom walk-through and managed to transfer it into a monitoring mechanism. The 'walk through' typically refers to a supervisor briefly visiting a teacher classroom to observe the physical condition (e.g. bulletin board displays) as well as the teaching taking place at the time. Finally, Shulman, Sullivan & Ganz (2008) write that the pressure to produce data and outcomes has impeded the development of a supervisory environment where quality supervision exists.

It is sensible, I think, to surmise that in order to maximize the opportunity for teaching success, certain conditions should ideally be present within the educational infrastructure, and especially within the classroom. For teachers, these conditions include reasonable class sizes, up-to-date books, and paperwork which is commensurate with the amount of hours worked in a given day. These conditions, however, are beyond the scope of the teacher role and are instead reliant on other roles within the educational infrastructure. This is an important consideration when examining the teacher role and how its effectiveness is influenced by other roles operating around it. Indeed, in 2007 152.7 million dollars were provided by New York State to the NYC Department of Education for class size reduction

(UFT, 2008). These funds were disbursed to 390 schools with particularly disappointing results. The complete data analysed across grades indicated that average class size was reduced only one tenth (.10) of a student in kindergarten through third grade (ages 5-9) and only six tenths of a student (.6) in fourth through eighth grades (ages 10-14) (UFT, 2008). At the same time, the Office of Teaching Initiatives (NYSED, 2011b) has made significant changes to the required accumulation of appropriate teaching credentials. 'Permanent Certificates' which were once valid for life have been replaced with 'Professional Certificates.' In order to keep their validity, these new certificates require teachers to complete 175 hours of training within five year cycles (NYSED, 2011a).This is in addition to the required undergraduate and graduate degrees all teachers must obtain (NYSED 2011a).

Using the immediate examples above, it appears that New York City's inherent focus on accountability has concentrated itself selectively on the teaching layers (e.g. credentials) - with a significantly less prominent presence in the non-teaching layers. Variability of accountability can be evidenced in other roles within the education infrastructure. The New York State Supreme Court, as part of a response to a 2002 lawsuit against the inadequacy of the NYC Education System, (allegedly due to lack of funding from the state), reversed a decision made by the appellate court and ruled in favour of the state. The court decision was based on 75 witnesses and 4,300 documents which were used as evidence (Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., et al., v. the State of New York, et al., 2002, quoted by Lerner J. at p. 8). The court issued the following statement regarding the current standards set by the state and how they might be translated in NYC schools:

> Proof of non-compliance with one or more of the Regents' or Commissioner's standards may not, standing alone, establish a violation of the Education Article, since such standards often exceed notions of a minimally adequate or sound basic education and are sometimes merely aspirational. (Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., et al., v. the State of New York, et al., 2002, quoted by Lerner J. at p. 5).

Indeed, an examination of the 159 pages of Common Core Learning Standards (Common Core State Standards Initiative, 2011), not including appendices, communicates a very high standard of criteria for both teachers and students. According to the Common Core State Standards website (2011) criteria are aligned with college and work expectations; use a rigorous content and application of knowledge through higher-order skills; build upon strengths and lessons of current state standards, are informed by top-performing countries and are evidence and/or research-based. In contrast to these standards, the State Supreme Court deemed that the state is only accountable for providing the opportunity for a sound and basic education which would allow one to function productively in society (Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., et al., v. the State of New York, et al., 2002, p. 13). According to the referenced court document, a basic education should consist of the skills necessary to obtain employment and to discharge one's civic responsibilities. The 'ability to function productively' was interpreted minimally as the ability to get a job, support oneself and not be a charge on the public society (Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., et al., v. the State of New York, et al., 2002, p. 13).

Here we see the same state (New York) working with two very different standards of accountability among roles. The aim here is not to be critical of the Common Core Standards, nor to question the final judgement of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity, but instead, to draw the reader's attention to the contrasting variability in accountability among the various roles (high and low level) operating and supporting the New York City education system. On the one hand, we have a State Supreme Court articulating that the state is not accountable for providing anything beyond a basic, minimal level of education. While on other hand we see significant teacher accountability measures being enforced (in New York

City) to ensure that the standards (created by the same state which has been abdicated of accountability to reach them) are achieved**.**

Organisational Models for New York City Education

Mending the Broken Link

The absence of formalized feedback mechanisms within the NYC system has undoubtedly contributed to the increased gap between policy-makers and teachers. The following section examines this lack of connectivity by examining some organisational structures together with their suitability to primary and secondary schooling in New York City. The role each structure plays in encouraging specific forms of professionalism is also explored.

When looking at organisational models in general, the traditional hierarchical structure, which supports a top-down management methodology, has been the most widely used structure in both corporate business and education. Evers (2010) describes the advantages of the hierarchical structure, including its ability to break down large complex processes into smaller more attainable parts. A particular task, for example, can fail to be done because it is cognitively too complex for one person. By breaking this task into smaller more manageable sub-tasks, however, a group of specialized members can see it to completion (Evers, 2010). The hierarchical model, however, has been particularly inefficient in the New York City school system. One of the most difficult challenges the New York City school system faces is creating an on-going exchange among the multiple layers of authority which exist within its bureaucratic system of 1,400 schools, 80,000 teachers and 6,000 central office and regional staff (Meyer, 2008). Of special challenge is filtering this exchange to the level of classroom teachers. The hierarchical organisational structure can be viewed as a model which has historically supported traditional professionalism. It is described as having long chains of command and short spans of control (Palardy, 1988). These long chains of command can be seen in the multiple layers which typically exist above the teacher role:

> *the teacher → the principal → the regional subject area-coordinator → the coordinator for elementary or secondary education → the assistant superintendent in charge of instruction → the superintendent of schools (Palardy, 1988).*

Long chains of command typically translate into limited control. That is, those on the bottom of the hierarchy (principals & teachers) often have less control and find themselves with little real authority and only minor decision-making roles (Palardy, 1988). From a visual perspective alone, one can see that while information moves from the top through the multitude of layers, the flow of information has many opportunities for delay and, intended or unintended, manipulation. In New York City, we see Mayor Bloomberg attempting to address this shortcoming through the transfer of school budgetary and financial responsibility to principals (Shulman, Sullivan & Glanz, 2008). Of course, how these budgets are determined and whether they cover the needs of each school is another matter.

In New York City, the move towards educator accountability has depended largely on data derived from student standardized test scores (Shulman, Sullivan & Glanz, 2008) (UFT, 2010). The superimposition of managerial professionalism onto a hierarchical organisational structure, however, has translated into restrictive and distended forms of teacher behaviour. According to Hargreaves and Goodson (1996) restricted teacher behaviour is characterized by individuals who concern themselves only with what is happening within the confines of their own classrooms. In contrast, distended teacher behaviour is characterized by individuals who have taken on too many additional responsibilities, many of which may stretch beyond their own classroom. One might argue that the current NYC school culture

has managed to create a hybrid teacher role which combines these two contrasting behaviours. Excessive micro-management, with a punitive response to low test scores in New York City (Shulman, Sullivan & Glanz, 2008; UFT, 2010) might be placing teachers into restrictive roles. Concurrently, the same teachers may be seen as distending themselves, not necessarily because they are taking on additional responsibilities beyond their classrooms, but perhaps because they have taken on a multitude of legal documentation-type responsibilities *within* their classrooms.

A purely mechanical interpretation of productivity, such as that provided in a traditional hierarchical system, is probably least applicable and most damaging to the learning profession. This is because the nature of education is rooted in human interaction. Although referring specifically to the connectivity between vocational and academic education in the U.K., Michael Young's (1993) call for organisational restructuring is also relevant to the broader concept of systems:

> A model of a system in which direction and purpose are defined externally from above may be increasingly inappropriate. A new concept of system may be necessary in which purpose and direction are interdependent and internal to the parts. (Young, p. 17)

In applying this concept of broader connectivity to organisational structures, Evers (2010) goes beyond the hierarchical model to describe an Organisational Learning Structure. This structure is based on the belief that the opportunity for correcting errors occurs when top-down expectations meet feedback experience from the bottom. That is, when the "*anticipated consequences* of action meet their *actual consequences*" (Evers, 2010, p 242). A structural solution is proposed which ensures that practically-based feedback (bottom-up) is able to be matched against epistemic (top-down) expectations. In doing so, Evers (2010) combines the organisational learning model and hierarchical models by placing epistemic feedback loops into the traditional hierarchical organisational chart. Such a model encourages a more collaborative form of professionalism in that connections are placed where they did not exist before.

Still another alternative model is the Dual Structure Model, which offers teachers and low-level administrators one sphere of responsibility and high-level administrators another (Palardy, 1988). Palardy assigns financing decisions under the umbrella of high level administrative decisions, whereas teachers and principals make decisions about professional matters such as curriculum and instruction. One of the benefits of such a system is the opportunity for professionals to focus more on what they know best. In contrast, one of the dangers is the potential for fragmented work and the isolation of roles. Elements of the Dual Structure are reminiscent of the U.S government's 'separation of powers' model. In an effort to prevent abuse of power, the U.S federal government divided itself into three branches of power: the executive, legislative and judicial branches. While the constitution gave each branch specific powers and areas of responsibility, a system of *'checks and balances'* ensured that each branch had the means to restrain the other two. For example, while the legislative branch was given the power to create laws, the judicial branch was given the concurrent power to declare a law unconstitutional (Boyer & Stuckey, 1996, p. 49). Realizing the need for future adjustments, a formalized amendment process was also incorporated within this model (Boyer & Stuckey, 1996, p.40).

When combined with Evers' (2010) Learning Organisational Model, the Dual Structure Model (Palardy,1988) offers great potential in establishing a system which encourages and supports a more democratic professionalism. First, when applying the 'separation of powers' model to education, each branch (dual or otherwise) would be well aware of the others' responsibilities and could exercise its influence within formalized democratic mechanisms. Second, these formalized mechanisms would establish the reciprocal movement of

information *within* the education system, as well as the necessary movement *external* to the education system (e.g. community voice). Third, by embedding the appropriate system of 'checks and balances' into the larger infrastructure the disparity often found between rhetoric and actual application might be significantly minimized through the restraining sub-systems (which would need to be identified).

Conclusion

An Aerial View

I prefer to think of an organisational structure as a kind of blueprint for building roads in a given community. A well-thought out blueprint will anticipate traffic and congestion in certain areas, at certain times. The design will take key travel information into account and allow for the easy movement of cars through main roads as well as alternative routes during busier times. Whichever route a driver may choose to use, the end result should always equate to the driver getting to his/her destination safely and within a reasonable amount of time. In the absence of a well-thought out blueprint, drivers can expect traffic jams, long waits and even increased accidents. In this metaphorical analysis, the cars represent the systematic and predictable movement of information. This movement does not flow in a single direction. The same car moves towards a destination and then away from that destination in any given day, each time bringing with it updated feedback. The roads, in turn, represent the adequacy of the organisational structure. In particular, the lines of communication and exchange which are so vital to building a robust and healthy organisation.

When considering the above analysis, structural design is not a peripheral matter or a mere add-on. It is instead a central component which lays the foundation for an effective and responsive system. Looking at various modes of professionalism through the lens of organisational structure allows us to step back and gain a holistic view of both information movement and human behaviour. It allows us to follow this movement through all levels of an organisational structure so that we can better understand the nature of professional roles and the challenges they each face. More importantly, it provides us with the opportunity to re-align mechanisms in such a way that they support - not contradict - the outcomes, standards and behaviours we seek.

That big cities deal with a diverse group of students who pose greater challenges than their suburban counterparts is nothing new. Socio-economic status, language diversity and limited social/cultural capital are just some of the factors which are likely to contribute to these challenges. Nevertheless, anticipating this reality and incorporating the necessary mechanisms to support these challenges is key, if city schools are to reach their potential. If we are to accept the premise that effectiveness in any role is reflected through a process of reciprocity, then we can no longer address the teacher role in isolation. Instead, we must look to address multiple roles and their relationships *simultaneously*. It is here that we might begin to breathe life into policy, so that it finally moves beyond the paper it is written on. It is here that we might finally fit rhetoric with practice - and begin to transform the static professional qualities into the living and breathing experiences of professionalism.

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